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Section 1983 Claims
Michael A Zwibelmant
A victim of sexual harassment by a teacher may wish to sue
the teacher, the principal, the members of the school board, the
superintendent, the school district itself, and the municipality in
which the school district operates. Typically, the plaintiff will
want to bring two types of claims: (1) constitutional claims under
42 USC § 1983,1 which provides a cause of action against state ac-
tors for violations of the Constitution and federal laws; and (2) a
claim under Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments of
1972,2 either as an implied right of action under Title IX itself3 or
as a Section 1983 claim predicated on Title IX.4
Lower courts disagree as to whether Title IX precludes a
plaintiff from bringing Constitution-based Section 1983 claims as
well as Section 1983 claims predicated on Title IX itself. Because
the distinction between Constitution-based and statute-based
Section 1983 claims is critical, it is important to understand how
a statute like Title IX can preclude both a Section 1983 claim
predicated on Title IX itself as well as a Section 1983 claim predi-
cated on a constitutional right. The Supreme Court set out the
important test in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v Na-
t BA. 1995, Stanford University; M.PA. Candidate 1999, Princeton University; J.D.
Candidate 1999, The University of Chicago.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 USC § 1983 (1994).
' Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Pub L No
92-318, 86 Stat 235 (1972), codified at 20 USC § 1681(a) (1994).
' See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 689 (1979) (holding that individu-
als have a private right of action under Title IX).
' See Blessing v Freestone, 117 S Ct 1353, 1359 (1997) ("In order to seek redress
through § 1983 ... a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a
violation of federal law."); Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4 (1980) (holding that Section
1983 claims may be predicated on federal statutory rights); Cannon, 441 US at 688 n 9,
693-94 (acknowledging that Title IX "create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff").
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tional Sea Clammers Association.5 Under the Sea Clammers
comprehensiveness test,' Title IX claims--that is, private rights
of action brought directly under Title IX-can preclude Section
1983 claims predicated on Title IX if Title IX's remedial scheme
(the termination of federal funding) is sufficiently comprehensive
to demonstrate Congress's intent to preclude the statutory-based
Section 1983 remedy.' Title IX can also preclude Constitution-
based Section 1983 claims,9 but only if the constitutional rights
upon which the Section 1983 claim is predicated are virtually
identical to the rights conferred by Title IX and if Congress in-
tended the remedial scheme of Title IX to serve as the exclusive
means by which a plaintiff might vindicate her rights."
Whether a plaintiff can bring both Title IX and Section 1983
claims has important implications for her ability to vindicate her
statutory and constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, has not settled a disagreement among lower courts as to
whether individual defendants-such as teachers, principals, and
school board members-are proper defendants under Title IN- If
individuals are not proper defendants under Title IX, and if a
plaintiff were not able to bring her Section 1983 claims against
those individuals because Title IX precludes all Section 1983
claims, then she would be unable to reach the individuals respon-
sible for her injuries.
Plaintiffs may also want to bring both Title IX and Section
1983 claims in order to take advantage of Section 1983's lower
burden of proof for supervisory liability. For example, a plaintiff
may find it easier to prove that the principal, superintendent, or
school district were responsible for a teacher's misconduct under
Section 1983, which generally requires a showing of gross negli-
gence, than under Title IX, which requires a showing of actual
6 453 US 1 (1981).
Id at 20.
"The express statutory means of enforcement is administrative: The statute directs
federal agencies who distribute education funding to establish requirements to effectuate
the nondiscrimination mandate, and permits the agencies to enforce those requirements
through 'any... means authorized by law,' including ultimately the termination of federal
funding." Gebser v Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S Ct 1989, 1994 (1998),
quoting 20 USC § 1682 (1994).
' For a concrete example of what the Court means by a "sufficiently comprehensive"
remedial scheme, see note 18. See also text accompanying notes 84-87.
' Examples of Constitution-based Section 1983 claims include claims predicated on
the right to bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause, or the right to be free from in-
tentional discrimination on the basis of sex under the Equal Protection Clause.
"9 See Smith v Robinson, 468 US 992, 1008-11 (1984). See also notes 22-29 and accom-
panying text and text accompanying note 89.
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knowledge plus deliberate indifference on the part of supervisory
officials and institutions.
Part I of this Comment provides an exposition of the law of
Section 1983 preclusion and highlights the lower courts' devia-
tions from Supreme Court precedent. Parts H and M respectively
argue that Title IX precludes neither Section 1983 claims based
on Title IX itself nor those based on constitutional rights. These
two Parts also demonstrate that while some courts may have
reached the legally correct result in Section 1983 preclusion
cases, no court has applied the legal tests in a way that is wholly
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Part IV discusses the
impact that Title IX's potential foreclosure of Section 1983 claims
has on plaintiffs and defendants in sexual harassment and dis-
crimination lawsuits. This Comment concludes that the Supreme
Court's test for implied statutory rights of action may reduce the
Section 1983 preclusion analysis to a mere formality: a judicial
determination that a statute creates an implied right of action
compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preclude
Section 1983 claims.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 1983 PRECLUSION
When confronting the question of whether a particular stat-
ute precludes Section 1983 claims, the Supreme Court applies
two distinct tests depending upon the nature of the Section 1983
claim. For Section 1983 claims predicated on statutory rights,"
the Supreme Court applies the Sea Clammers comprehensiveness
test to determine whether Congress implicitly intended to pre-
clude the Section 1983 cause of action by providing a comprehen-
sive remedial scheme in the statute itself.2 For Section 1983
claims predicated on constitutional rights, the Supreme Court
applies the two-pronged test from Smith v Robinson.3 This test
analyzes, first, the similarity of the rights underlying the Section
1983 claim to the rights conferred by the relevant statute, and,
second, whether Congress intended to preclude the Constitution-
based Section 1983 claim. 4
" See Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4 (1980) ("[T]he § 1983 remedy broadly encom-
passes violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.').
12 See Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association, 496 US 498, 521 (1990), quoting Sea
Clammers, 453 US at 20. Congress, of course, may foreclose Section 1983 claims explicitly
in a particular statute.
468 US 992 (1984).
" Id at 1008-09.
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A. Preclusion of Statute-Based Section 1983 Claims
One year after Maine v Thiboutot, s which granted plaintiffs
the ability to bring Section 1983 claims predicated on federal
statutory rights, 6 the Court limited the reach of the decision. In
Sea Clammers, the Court held that Section 1983 claims predi-
cated on two federal environmental statutes were precluded by
the "unusually elaborate" enforcement provisions in the statutes
themselves." In other words, the statutes' remedial schemes were
"sufrciently comprehensive" to evidence Congress's intent to pre-
clude Section 1983 claims predicated upon those statutes. 8
Two underlying rationales help explain the Sea Clammers
holding. First, Sea Clammers addressed only statute-based Sec-
tion 1983 claims, not those resting on constitutional violations.
Since its passage in 1871, Section 1983 has afforded individuals
protection against the conduct of state actors who have violated
the individuals' constitutional rights. 9 It was not until 1980 that
the Supreme Court recognized that violations of federal law
would also be actionable under Section 1983.0 The decision in
Sea Clammers, then, can be seen as an attempt to constrain the
Thiboutot departure from the century-old interpretation of Sec-
tion 1983. Second, Sea Clammers hinges on congressional intent.
Specifically, the comprehensiveness analysis aims to effect Con-
gress's desire to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the reme-
dial schemes of federal statutes by bringing Section 1983 claims.2
"448 US 1 (1980).
"Id at 4.
17453 US at 13.
Id at 20. The environmental statutes at issue in Sea Clammers-the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1994), and the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act, 33 USC §§ 1401 et seq (1994)-contain detailed provisions that
authorize private citizens to sue for injunctions to enforce the acts. See Sea Clammers, 453
US at 6, 14, 17. The statutes also require citizen plaintiffs to give sixty days notice to the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, the State, and any alleged violator. See
id at 6, 14.
19 For a historical summary of Section 1983 actions, see Nancy Levit, Preemption of
Section 1983 by Title VII: An Unwarranted Deprivation of Remedies, 15 Hofstra L Rev
265, 266-76 (1987).
Thiboutot, 448 US at 4.
21 See, for example, Sea Clammers, 453 US at 20 & n 30, quoting Chapman v Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, 441 US 600, 673 n 2 (1979) (Stewart dissenting) ("[When] a
state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own compre-
hensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be
bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983."); Meyerson v Arizona, 507 F Supp 859,
864 (D Ariz 1981) ("[T~he remedial provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the
remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act[, 31 USC § 1242 (1976)].").
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B. Preclusion of Constitution-Based Section 1983 Claims
For Section 1983 claims predicated on constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court has applied a different preclusion test-the
two-pronged test developed in Smith.22 Smith involved the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"),2 which was "set up by Con-
gress to aid the States in complying with their constitutional ob-
ligations to provide public education for handicapped children."24
Because the EHA conferred a right upon a plaintiff that was "vir-
tually identical" to the plaintiff's equal protection right to a pub-
licly financed special education, the Court held that Section 1983
claims predicated on the Equal Protection Clause were precluded
by the EHA.'
The first prong of the Smith test, then, requires courts to de-
termine whether the constitutional right upon which the Section
1983 claim is predicated is "virtually identical" to the right con-
ferred by the federal statute." If the Section 1983 constitutional
right is not virtually identical, then the statute does not preclude
the Section 1983 claim unless the statute explicitly indicates oth-
erwise.27
If the constitutional right upon which the Section 1983 claim
is based is virtually identical to rights conferred by the statute,
then courts must apply the second prong of the Smith test, which
asks whether Congress intended the statute to be the "exclusive
avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [constitutional]
"468 US at 1008-09 (noting that a statutory remedy precludes Constitution-based
Section 1983 claims that are virtually identical to the statutory claims if Congress intends
such a result).
"20 USC §§ 1400 et seq (1982).
468 US at 1009.
"Id. Prior to the enactment of the EHA, two district courts issued consent decrees re-
quiring schools to provide handicapped children with access to public education. Mills v
Board of Education of the District of Columbia v Pennsylvania, 348 F Supp 866 (D DC
1972); Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v Pennsylvania, 334 F Supp 1257
(E D Pa 1971). These cases played a substantial role in the development of the EHA. See
Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v Rowley, 485 US 176, 192
(1982) (describing this development).
468 US at 1008-09.
Id at 1009. The Sixth Circuit accurately presented the two-pronged Smith test in
Lillard v Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F3d 716 (6th Cir 1996), and demonstrated
how both prongs must be satisfied before preclusion of Constitution-based Section 1983
claims. Id at 723 (holding that courts may foreclose a Constitution-based Section 1983
claim only if the "constitutional claims... [are] virtually identical to the statutory...
claims, and [if the] legislative history indicat[es] a congressional intention to preclude re-
liance on Section 1983 as a remedy") (emphasis added). See also Levit, 15 Hofstra L Rev at
282-83 (cited in note 19) (noting that many courts have adopted the "independent rights
theory," which allows a plaintiff to sue under both the statute and Section 1983, provided
that the Section 1983 claims are predicated on "a right independently guaranteed by the
Constitution').
14691998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
claims."8 If so, the statute precludes the Section 1983 claim."
Under Smith, then, even if a plaintiff raises a Section 1983 claim
predicated on a constitutional right that is identical to the right
conferred by a statute, that statute will not preclude the Section
1983 claim unless the court finds that Congress intended such
preclusion.
C. Summary of Section 1983 Preclusion Law
Because the Supreme Court has announced separate tests for
statute-based and Constitution-based Section 1983 claims in Sea
Clammers and Smith, respectively, courts confronted with the
Section 1983 preclusion issue must first determine how to classify
the particular Section 1983 claims involved. Section 1983 claims
fall into three distinct categories: (1) Section 1983 claims predi-
cated on statutory rights; (2) Section 1983 claims predicated on
constitutional rights that are not virtually identical to the rights
conferred by the federal statute under which the plaintiff seeks to
bring a Section 1983 claim; and (3) Section 1983 claims based on
constitutional rights that are virtually identical to rights con-
ferred by the federal statute under which the plaintiff seeks to
bring a Section 1983 claim.
If the cause of action is a Section 1983 claim predicated on
statutory rights, then courts must apply the Sea Clammers
comprehensiveness test. If the Section 1983 action is predicated
on a constitutional right that is not virtually identical to a right
conferred by the statute in question, then courts must conclude
that the statute does not preclude the Constitution-based claim,
unless Congress clearly intended otherwise. If the constitutional
Section 1983 claim is predicated on a constitutional right that is
virtually identical to a right conferred by the statute, then courts
must apply the second prong of the Smith test to determine
whether Congress intended to preclude Constitution-based Sec-
tion 1983 claims.
D. Lower Courts' Deviations from Supreme Court Precedent
Ten lower courts in nine judicial circuits have faced the
question of Title IX's preclusion of Section 1983 claims:
468 US at 1009.
Congressional intent can manifest itself in three ways: (1) Congress can explicitly
provide that the statute's remedial scheme shall be the exclusive avenue for relief; (2) the
legislative history may provide strong evidence that Congress intended exclusivity; or (3) a
detailed, elaborate remedial scheme may provide evidence that Congress implicitly in-
tended exclusivity. See Part III.B.
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DOES TITLE lX PRECLUDE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS?
TYPE OF CLAIM YES NO
SECTION 1983 Lakoski (5th Cir 1995)?°  Lillard (6th Cir 1996)?
CLAIMS Waid (7th Cir 1996)P Crawford (8th Cir 1997)
PREDICATED Seanons (10th Cir 1996)? Oona R.-S. (N D Cal 1995) 7
ON TITLE IX Bruneau (N D NY 1996)3
Bougher (w D Pa 1989)?
SECTION 1983 Williams (3d Cir 1993)? Lillard (6th Cir 1996)41
CLAIMS Waid (7th Cir 1996)? Crawford (8th Cir 1997)2
PREDICATED ON Mennone (D Conn 1995)40 Seamons (10th Cir 1996)f3
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
No two courts have applied the same analysis," and no court
has applied the law in the methodical fashion described above. In
particular, lower courts have deviated from Supreme Court
precedent in four areas. First, some lower courts have failed to
distinguish between statute-based and Constitution-based Sec-
tion 1983 claims when applying the Sea Clammers doctrine. In
opinions since Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court has been care-
ful to distinguish between Section 1983 claims predicated on
Lakoski v James, 66 F3d 751, 755-58 (5th Cir 1995). The plaintiff in Lakoski
brought a Section 1983 claim predicated on Title IX itself. Therefore, the court's conclu-
sion that Title IX forecloses Section 1983 claims based on Title IX itself is a holding of the
case. For the sake of brevity, the remaining footnotes for the chart will include parentheti-
cals indicating simply "holding" or "dicta."
Waid v Merrill Area Public Schools, 91 F3d 857, 862 (7th Cir 1996) (dicta).
Seamons v Snow, 84 F3d 1226, 1234 n 8 (10th Cir 1996) (dicta).
Bruneau v South Kortright Central School District, 935 F Supp 162, 178-79 (N D NY
1996) (holding).
Bougher v University of Pittsburgh, 713 F Supp 139, 146 (W D Pa 1989) (holding).
Lillard v Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F3d 716, 723 (6th Cir 1996) (dicta).
Crawford v Davis, 109 F3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir 1997) (holding).
Oona R.-S. by Kate S. v Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F Supp 1452, 1462 (N D Cal
1995) (holding), affd, Oona R.-S. by Kate S. v McCaffrey, 122 F3d 1207 (9th Cir 1997), or-
der withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehg, 143 F3d 473 (9th Cir 1998), amended on
denial of rehg, 1998 US App LEXIS 8805, petition for cert filed, 67 USLW 3083 (June 19,
1998) (No 98-101).
Williams v School District of Bethlehem, 998 F2d 168, 176 (3d Cir 1993) (holding).
91 F3d at 862 (holding).
Mennone v Gordon, 889 F Supp 53, 59-60 (D Conn 1995) (holding).
"76 F3d at 723-24 (holding).
42 109 F3d at 1284 (holding).
84 F3d at 1234 (holding).
"Although the Seventh Circuit in Waid described the Third Circuit's approach in Wil-
liams as "persuasive," the Seventh Circuit applied a much more thorough analysis of the
tests. Waid, 91 F3d at 861-63. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Seamons cited the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Lillard approvingly, although the Seamons court failed to apply the sec-
ond prong of the Smith "virtually identical" test. Seamons, 84 F3d at 1234.
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statutory rights and those based on constitutional rights; specifi-
cally, the Court has applied the Sea Clammers comprehensive-
ness test in the former cases but never in the latter cases.45 Some
lower courts, however, have improperly applied the Sea Clam-
mers comprehensiveness test to Constitution-based Section 1983
claims in the context of a Title IX preclusion analysis.46 Instead,
the courts should have applied the Smith test. Applying Sea
Clammers to Constitution-based claims is problematic, because
the Sea Clammers case involved a statute-based Section 1983
claim, and, therefore, did not address the issue of Constitution-
based Section 1983 preclusion. Moreover, when courts conflate
the two types of Section 1983 claims and apply the Sea Clammers
test to constitutional claims, they overlook Sea Clammers' narrow
holding. The Sea Clammers Court intended only to limit the
reach of Thiboutot to disturb the historical importance of vindi-
cating constitutional rights through Section 1983 actions.4"
Second, some lower courts have failed to distinguish among
different types of Constitution-based claims when applying the
Smith test. In Smith, the Supreme Court required that each Con-
stitution-based Section 1983 claim be analyzed separately under
a two-pronged test; lower courts, however, often have conflated
multiple constitutional claims. In Williams v School District of
Bethlehem,49 for example, the Third Circuit failed to distinguish
between the plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims
and, without applying the Smith two-pronged test, held that both
constitutional claims were precluded." Similarly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Seamons v Snow,"' did not separately assess the plaintiff's
multiple Constitution-based Section 1983 claims. Faced with sev-
eral distinct constitutional allegations under Section 1983,52 the
' See, for example, Blessing v Freestone, 117 S Ct 1353, 1360 (1997) (applying the
comprehensiveness test to Section 1983 claims based on Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act); Wilder, 496 US at 520-21 (applying the comprehensiveness test to Section 1983
claims based on the Medicaid Act); Wright v City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 US 418, 424, 429 (1987) (applying the comprehensiveness test to Section
1983 claims based on the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937).
See Williams, 998 F2d at 176; Mennone, 889 F Supp at 59-60.
"See text accompanying notes 19-21. See also Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 180 (1961)
(discussing the importance of Section 1983 in protecting federal rights); Levit, 15 Hofstra
L Rev at 266-68 (cited in note 19).
See Part I.B.
'9 998 F2d 168 (3d Cir 1993).
Id at 176.
84 F3d 1226 (10th Cir 1996).
In Seamons, the plaintiff alleged that "[d]efendants are liable under [Section 1983]
for violating [plaintiff's] constitutional rights to procedural due process, substantive due
process, freedom of association, freedom of speech, familial association, and for violating
[plaintiff's] right to equal education and equal protection." Id at 1230.
1472 [65:1465
Title IX and Section 1983
Tenth Circuit should have applied the Smith two-pronged test to
each individual constitutional claim.
Third, some courts have applied Smith incorrectly by failing
to adhere to the "virtually identical" language of the first prong of
the test. The district court in Mennone v Gordon,53 for example,
inquired whether the different constitutional claims were based
on the same set of underlying facts.' Similarly, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Waid v Merrill Area Public Schools55 held that a plaintiff
could not claim that a "single set of facts" led to causes of action
under both Title IX and Section 1983.56 Neither the Mennone nor
the Waid court explicitly applied the "virtually identical" prong of
the Smith test." Instead of comparing the right under Title IX
(freedom from sex discrimination) with the constitutional rights
underlying the Section 1983 claims to determine whether they
were virtually identical, the courts inquired as to whether all of
the claims (Title IX and Section 1983) arose out of the same set of
underlying facts.
There are two problems with the approaches taken by the
Mennone and Waid courts. First, the Supreme Court has articu-
lated a specific test in Smith to be applied in Constitution-based
Section 1983 preclusion cases, and lower courts must follow it.
Second, a "same set of facts" test used by these courts requires
them to venture too far from the underlying purposes of the
Smith "virtually identical" prong. Two claims may arise out of the
same set of facts but may be completely independent of each
other; that is, Congress may intend to provide overlapping reme-
dies for claims that arise out of the same set of facts but that are
not virtually identical. A plaintiff, for example, may bring a Title
IX claim for sexual harassment as well as a Section 1983 claim
predicated on the substantive due process right to bodily integ-
rity." Both claims arise out of the same set of underlying facts
(the sexual assault), but the rights involved are not virtually
identical, because Title IX confers a right to be free from dis-
crimination on the basis of sex and does not speak to the issue of
bodily integrity.
889 F Supp 53 (D Conn 1995).
Idat 60n4.
91 F3d 857 (7th Cir 1996).
Id at 862.
' However, the Seventh Circuit in Waid, without invoking Smith, noted that the
plaintiff's constitutional Section 1983 claim was "essentially identical" to her rights under
Title IX. Id at 861.
See, for example, the allegations in Seamons, described at note 52.
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Finally, contrary to the methodical Section 1983 preclusion
analysis presented in this Part, some lower courts have concluded
that Title IX precludes Section 1983 claims after merely con-
ducting a summary comprehensiveness analysis. The district
court in Oona R.-S. by Kate S. v Santa Rosa City Schools, 9 criti-
cized three courts for failing to undertake the "thorough analysis
of the comprehensiveness of Title IX's remedial scheme required
to establish Congressional intent to foreclose a section 1983 rem-
edy."0 The Tenth Circuit also summarily concluded in dicta that
Title IX precludes Section 1983 claims predicated on Title IX it-
self.6' Regardless of the nature of the Section 1983 claim, courts
must carefully analyze the remedial scheme of the statute in
question and make a careful inquiry into whether Congress in-
tended a statute to preclude Section 1983 claims.
II. TITLE IX DOES NOT PRECLUDE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
PREDICATED ON TITLE IX ITSELF
This Part will argue that a faithful reading of Sea Clammers
and its successor line of cases leads to the conclusion that Title IX
does not preclude Section 1983 claims predicated on Title IX it-
self. This conclusion follows from two principal arguments. First,
the Supreme Court on repeated occasions has made clear that
courts must invoke a strong presumption against Section 1983
preclusion. Second, courts must limit their comprehensiveness
analysis to Title IX's explicit remedial scheme and may not con-
sider either judicially created remedies or remedies that may be
available in other statutes.
A. Courts Must Invoke a Strong Presumption
Against Preclusion
When analyzing whether Title IX precludes Section 1983
claims predicated on Title IX itself, courts must first acknowledge
the strong presumption against preclusion. In each Section 1983
preclusion case since Sea Clammers, the Court has expressed its
890 F Supp 1452 (N D Cal 1995). Subsequent case history discussed in note 37.
890 F Supp at 1461-62 n 3, citing Bougher, 713 F Supp at 146 (concluding without
analysis that Title IX 'contains its own remedies and is implemented through its own pro-
cedural scheme"); Pfeiffer v Marion Center Area School District, 917 F2d 779, 789 (3d Cir
1990) (accepting, without analysis, that Sea Clammers foreclosed plaintiff's Section 1983
constitutional claims); Mabry v State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational
Education, 597 F Supp 1235, 1239 (D Colo 1984) (stating without analysis that it was
"convinced" that plaintiff's remedies under Title IX would have been comprehensive had
she prevailed on that claim).
" Seamons, 84 F3d at 1234 n 8.
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reluctance to preclude the Section 1983 cause of action. In Li-
vadas v Bradshaw,62 for example, the Court declared statute-
based Section 1983 claims to be "generally and presumptively
available" and described preclusion as an "exceptional case[ ]."i
Similarly, the Court in Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association
asserted that "[w]e do not lightly conclude that Congress in-
tended to preclude reliance" on statute-based Section 1983
claims.' The Court also noted in Wright v City of Roanoke Rede-
velopment & Housing AuthorityP that evidence of legislative his-
tory supporting Section 1983 preclusion must "raise a clear infer-
ence" of such intent.' Most recently, the Court held in Blessing v
Freestone' that defendants would have to make the "difficult
showing" that allowing statute-based Section 1983 claims would
be inconsistent with the statute's remedial scheme.69 Commenta-
tors agree that the burden of establishing Section 1983 preclusion
is a heavy one."
B. Courts Must Limit Their Comprehensiveness Analysis to
Title ]X's Explicit Remedial Scheme
Once courts acknowledge the strong presumption against
preclusion in statute-based Section 1983 cases, they must define
what constitutes proof that Title I's remedial scheme is compre-
hensive enough to demonstrate that Congress intended to pre-
clude a Section 1983 cause of action. This Part argues that courts
must apply the Sea Clammers comprehensiveness test only to the
statute's express remedial scheme, without considering evidence
of overlapping statutes or judicially created remedies.
a 512 US 107 (1994).
a Id at 133.
496 US 498 (1990).
Id at 520 (internal citations omitted).
479 US 418 (1987).
Id at 425. The Wright Court also expressed disapproval of the Fourth Circuit's
"summary conclusion" that the statute at issue foreclosed statute-based Section 1983
claims. Id at 424.
117 S Ct 1353 (1997).
Id at 1362.
70 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U Chi L Rev 394, 420-21 (1982) (arguing that defendants must make a
"fairly powerful showing of contrary legislative intent" before a court may preclude stat-
ute-based Section 1983 claims). Professor Sunstein also argues that "it is preferable for
the courts to disfavor repeal of section 1983 by implication" than to undertake an error-
prone "case-by-case inquiry" into congressional intent. Id at 425. See also Myron D. Ru-
meld, Note, Preclusion of Section 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive Statutory Re-
medial Schemes, 82 Colum L Rev 1183, 1189 (1982) (arguing that "intemperate applica-
tion of comprehensiveness would render the statutory reference of section 1983 without ef-
fect and eviscerate the Thiboutot decision").
1998] 1475
The University of Chicago Law Review
The Supreme Court consistently has stressed that the
comprehensiveness analysis is limited to the express remedial
scheme contained in the statute itself. In Wright, for example, the
Court stated that Section 1983 provides a remedial cause of ac-
tion for federal statutory rights unless the "state actor demon-
strates by express provision or other specific evidence from the
statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private en-
forcement. " 1 Similarly, the Court in Wilder reiterated the rule
that Congress must have precluded the statute-based Section
1983 claim "in the enactment itself" before a court may conclude
that preclusion is warranted. 2
Despite this language, some lower courts have looked to
other statutory remedies that may be available to plaintiffs when
applying the Sea Clammers comprehensiveness test. For exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit recognized in Lakoski v James73 that the
comprehensiveness test requires courts to "look to the remedial
measures provided by the statute itself," but nevertheless pro-
ceeded to consider factors outside of Title IX's remedial scheme.74
Although the Lakoski court acknowledged that it was unable to
conclude "that Title IX provides a remedial scheme sufficiently
comprehensive to indicate by itself that Congress intended to
foreclose § 1983 suits based upon rights created by Title IX," it
maintained that it "ought not... confine [its] inquiry into con-
gressional intent to the remedies afforded by Title IX."75 Instead,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that because other civil rights stat-
utes, such as Title VII, provide plaintiffs and courts with a "vari-
ety of tools to remedy employment discrimination," it was justi-
fied in precluding Section 1983 claims predicated on Title X 6
It could be argued that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lakoski
to consider the availability of other statutory remedies makes in-
tuitive sense and warrants a change in the "in the enactment it-
self" language of the Supreme Court case law. The Fifth Circuit's
use of other employment discrimination statutes in its preclusion
71 479 US at 423 (emphasis added). The Court in Wright limited its comprehensiveness
analysis to the Housing Act of 1937, 42 USC §§ 1401 et seq (1970), and concluded that
"W[t]here [was] nothing... found in the Brooke Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing
Act" that evidenced congressional intent to supplant the Section 1983 remedy. Id at 427.
Accord Suter v Artist M., 503 US 347, 355-56 (1992) ("We have subsequently recognized
that § 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute 'where Congress has
foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.") (citations omitted).
496 US at 508.
66 F3d 751 (th Cir 1995).
Id at 754.
7 Id at 755.
16 Id.
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analysis, however, ignores the strong language used by the Su-
preme Court in North Haven Board of Education v Bell." In Bell,
the Supreme Court stated that "even if alternative remedies are
available and their existence is relevant... this Court repeatedly
has recognized that Congress has provided a variety of remedies,
at times overlapping, to eradicate employment discrimination." s
Far from evidencing congressional intent to preclude Title IX-
based Section 1983 claims, then, the existence of other civil rights
statutes merely highlights the likelihood that discrimination
remedies sometimes will overlap.
The "in the enactment itself" requirement of the Sea Clam-
mers line of cases has important implications for Title IX's pur-
ported preclusion of Section 1983 claims predicated on Title IX,
because courts have created implied rights of action and remedies
under Title IX. The only express remedy provided for a Title IX
violation is the termination of federal funding by the appropriate
federal agency. 9 In Cannon v University of Chicago, 8 however,
the Supreme Court found an implied right of action under Title
IX for plaintiffs who have been discriminated against on the basis
of sex.8 ' Thirteen years later, the Court extended Cannon by
holding that the implied right of action under Title IX supports a
claim for monetary damages as well." If, instead of limiting their
analysis to Title IX's express remedial scheme, courts considered
these judicially created remedies when applying the Sea Clam-
mers comprehensiveness test, then the foreclosure question in the
Title IX context would be much more difficult. Given the Supreme
Coures "in the enactment itself" instructions in the post-Sea Clam-
mers cases, however, lower courts must not consider judicially
created remedies. The Court in Wilder was clear that it will "rec-
ognize an exception to the general rule that § 1983 provides a
remedy for violation of federal statutory rights only when Con-
gress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy."' Wilder and Sea
Clammers, therefore, prevent lower courts from considering even
judge-made remedies when applying the Sea Clammers
comprehensiveness test. The only remedy that courts may con-
- 456 US 512, 521-36 (1982) (holding that Title IX prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs).
78 Id at 535-36 n 26.
20 USC § 1682. See note 7.
80 441 US 677 (1979).
Id at 689.
Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 US 60, 72-73 (1992).
496 US at 508-09 n 9 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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sider is Title IX's express remedy: the withdrawal of federal
funding.
Given the strong presumption against statute-based Section
1983 preclusion and given the clear language from the Sea
Clammers line of cases that lower courts must limit their
comprehensiveness analysis to the express remedial scheme in
the statute itself, the conclusion that Title IX does not preclude
Section 1983 claims predicated on Title IX is inevitable. The only
express remedial provision in Title IX is the termination of fed-
eral funding, 4 and the Supreme Court held in both Wright and
Wilder that the remote threat of federal funding termination is
not a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to suggest a
congressional intent to preclude Section 1983 remedies.' As the
Eighth Circuit recognized in Crawford v Davis,86 Title IX's sole
remedy of terminating federal support is "a far cry from the 'un-
usually elaborate enforcement provisions' of the statutes at issue
in Sea Clammers, which expressly provided for citizen suits.
I. TITLE IX DOES NOT PRECLUDE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
PREDICATED ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
This Part demonstrates that Title IX does not preclude Sec-
tion 1983 claims predicated on constitutional rights that are not
virtually identical to rights conferred by Title IX, nor does it pre-
clude those constitutional claims that are virtually identical to
Title IX. The Sixth Circuit in Lillard v Shelby County Board of
Educations provides the proper articulation of the two-pronged
Smith test: courts may preclude a Constitution-based Section
1983 claim only if (1) the "constitutional claim[ ] [is] 'virtually
identical' to the statutory... claim[ ]," and (2) the "legislative
history indicat[es] a congressional intention to preclude reliance
on section 1983 as a remedy."89 In short, both prongs must be
satisfied before a court may preclude a Constitution-based Sec-
tion 1983 remedy."°
20 USC § 1682. See also note 7.
Wright, 479 US at 428 ("HUD's authority to audit, enforce annual contributions con-
tracts, and cut off federal funds [are] generalized powers [that] are insufficient to indicate
a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies."); Wilder, 496 US at 522 (holding
that the Wright conclusion is "even more appropriate in the context of the Medicaid Act"
because the Secretary's power to curtail federal funds to states is "lmited" and "insuffi-
cient to demonstrate an intent to foreclose relief... under § 1983").
109 F3d 1281 (8th Cir 1997).
Id at 1284 (internal citation omitted), quoting Sea Clammers, 453 US at 13.
76 F3d 716 (6th Cir 1996).
Id at 723, quoting Smith, 468 US at 1009.
See Part I.B.
1478 [65:1465
Title IX and Section 1983
A. Section 1983 Claims That Are Not Virtually Identical
to Title IX
A victim of sexual harassment by a teacher would have sev-
eral constitutional Section 1983 claims against the teacher and
the school district. She might bring claims based on: (1) the Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process, alleging a denial of a fair
hearing in which to bring her complaint; (2) the liberty interest in
bodily integrity under the substantive due process right in the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the right under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. Because Title IX confers on plain-
tiffs a right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex,9'
the plaintiffs third Constitution-based Section 1983 claim is "vir-
tually identical" to the right conferred by Title IX. Title X?'s pre-
clusive effects on the plaintiff's third claim, therefore, will be ad-
dressed in the next Part regarding virtually identical Section
1983 claims. This leaves the question of whether Title IX pre-
cludes either of the plaintiff's two remaining Section 1983 consti-
tutional claims.
A court confronted with these remaining Constitution-based
Section 1983 claims must determine whether either claim is vir-
tually identical to the right under Title IX against discrimination
on the basis of sex. The Smith Court did not define the terms
"virtually identical," 2 and the Court has not applied the Smith
test to a Constitution-based Section 1983 claim since. Similarly,
the lower courts have not defined "virtually identical" in any of
the Section 1983 preclusion cases involving Title IX.93 Courts,
therefore, should apply the plain meaning of "virtually identical."
Accordingly, neither procedural nor substantive due process
rights are identical to, or even virtually identical to, rights under
Title IX, which affords protection against discrimination on the
basis of sex.' Consequently, if a plaintiff brings procedural and
substantive due process claims under Section 1983, those claims
would not be precluded by Title IX, for they do not satisfy the
first prong of the Smith test.
" 20 USC § 1681(a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex.., be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.").
,' 468 US at 1009.
See text accompanying notes 53-58.
The only types of constitutional claims that would comport with the plain meaning
of "virtually identical" are equal protection-based ones, because only those types of claims
would be the same as the antidiscrimination rights conferred by Title IX.
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B. Section 1983 Claims That Are Virtually Identical to Title IX
A Section 1983 claim predicated on the right under the Equal
Protection Clause to be free of discrimination on the basis of sex
involves a right that is identical to the antidiscrimination right
created by Title IX itself. Therefore, the preclusion analysis for
equal protection-based Section 1983 claims must look to the sec-
ond prong of the Smith test, "whether Congress intended that
[Title IX] be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may
assert [constitutional] claims."95
In Smith, the plaintiffs brought Section 1983 claims predi-
cated on their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and both claims were
deemed "virtually identical" to rights conferred by the EHA. 6 Ap-
plying the second prong of the Smith test, the Court held that the
"carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism" set
out in the EHA provided evidence that Congress intended plain-
tiffs to pursue their constitutional claims through the EHA it-
self.97 Specifically, EHA procedures required that hearings con-
ducted by the state be fair and adequate and "effect Congress' in-
tent that each child's individual educational needs be worked out
through a process that begins on the local level and includes on-
going parent involvement, detailed procedural safeguards, and a
right to judicial review. 98
Unlike the detailed remedial procedures of the EHA, how-
ever, Title IX's sole statutory remedy is the termination of federal
funding-' Title IX, therefore, lacks the carefully tailored adminis-
trative scheme that might provide evidence of congressional in-
tent to preclude equal protection-based Section 1983 claims."° In
order to complete the preclusion analysis, then, courts must look
to the legislative history of Title IX to determine whether Con-
gress intended to preclude constitutional Section 1983 claims.1"'
In Cannon, the Supreme Court presented a detailed analysis
of the legislative history of Title IX in an effort to determine
468 US at 1009.
Id. The plaintiffs also brought a claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act.




'"The severity of federal funding termination makes actual imposition of the sanction
highly unlikely; in fact, such termination "is rarely, if ever, invoked." Lisa E. Key, Private
Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983, 29 UC Davis L Rev 283, 292-93
(1996). Congress understood the rarity of funding termination and fully expected indi-
viduals to bring private suits. See Cannon, 441 US at 704-05 & n 38.
"' See note 29.
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whether Congress intended the statute to confer a private right of
action on plaintiffs. °2 This analysis sheds light on Smith's con-
gressional intent inquiry. The Cannon court applied the four-
factor test of Cort v Ash 0 3 to determine whether Title IX created
an implied right of action. Cort's second factor is particularly im-
portant, as it asks whether there exists "any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one.""° In answer to this question, the Cannon Court
found that "[f]ar from evidencing any purpose to deny a private
cause of action, the history of Title IX rather plainly indicates
that Congress intended to create such a remedy." °5 The parallel
between the implied right of action inquiry and the Section 1983
preclusion inquiry is critical. The Supreme Courts analysis of Ti-
tle IX's legislative history found no evidence of congressional in-
tent to preclude private rights of action, suggesting that Congress
expected private plaintiffs to bring private suits under Title IX.'
Under the second prong of the Smith test, then, the Supreme
Court's holding in Cannon that Title IX supports a private right
of action necessarily means that Congress must not have in-
tended the threat of funding termination to be the "exclusive
avenue" by which plaintiffs could vindicate their constitutional
rights.' Therefore, even though an equal protection-based Sec-
"441 US at 689-717. For additional analysis of Title IX's legislative history, see
Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 US 60, 71-73 (1992); Bell, 456 US at 520-
30.
" 422 US 66, 78 (1975). The Court held
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly pro-
viding one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted ... ? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law.., so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?
Id (internal quotations and citations omitted).
' Id (emphasis added).
441 US at 694. It should be noted that, since Cannon, the Supreme Court has gen-
erally collapsed the four-pronged Cort v Ash test into a single-pronged test of congres-
sional intent. See, for example, Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia
concurring) ("It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington [442 US 560, 575-76 (1979)] and Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis [444 US 11, 18 (1979)], converting one of its four factors (con-
gressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three merely indicative of
its presence or absence.").
" Cannon, 441 US at 711-12 & n 49.
"'Smith, 468 US at 1009. Title IX, therefore, is unlike the EHA: Congress did expect
plaintiffs to abide by the EHA procedures to vindicate their constitutional rights. See id at
1016.
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tion 1983 claim is identical to the right conferred by Title IX, the
statute does not preclude the Section 1983 claim because Con-
gress did not intend the threat of funding termination to be the
exclusive avenue for relief.10
8
Allowing plaintiffs to bring Section 1983 constitutional
claims that are virtually identical to the rights under Title IX
might seem to be both redundant and wasteful. However, courts
and commentators have noted that "[t]he inertia of discrimina-
tory traditions... can only be curtailed by using a 'full arsenal' of
statutory weapons."'0 9 In particular, the Supreme Court has held
that the coverage of both Section 1983 and Title IX is to be
broadly construed,"0 and, as such, courts should adhere to the
general canon of statutory construction that "[statutory] repeals
by implication are disfavored.""' Equal protection-based Section
1983 claims and private Title IX claims may appear redundant,
but unless convincing proof can be offered that Congress intended
to foreclose one of these avenues, courts ought not preclude either
of them.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TITLE IXs NONPRECLUSION OF
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
Based on a faithful application of the Sea Clammers
comprehensiveness test and the two-pronged Smith test, Title IX
has no preclusive effect on a plaintiff's ability to bring Section
1983 claims, regardless of the right upon which the Section 1983
claim is based. The conclusion that Section 1983 claims are not
precluded in Title IX cases has important implications for plain-
tiffs, defendants, and federal courts, because the capacities to
reach certain defendants and the burdens of proof under the two
statutes are very different. Specifically, plaintiffs need the Sec-
tion 1983 remedy both to reach individual, rather than institu-
'"Accord Lillard, 76 F3d at 723 (holding that both prongs of the Smith test must be
met to foreclose Constitution-based Section 1983 claims).
"Roy L. Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment
Discrimination, 62 Cornell L Rev 258, 260 (1977), quoting Johnson v Railway Express
Agency, Inc, 421 US 454, 468 (1975) (Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Other courts have held that a plaintiff should be able to bring suit "under as many appli-
cable civil rights statutes as the facts of his case permit irrespective of the actual or poten-
tial overlap of statutory remedies." Johnson v Ballard, 644 F Supp 333, 337 (N D Ga
1986), quotingNilsen v City of Moss Point, 701 F2d 556, 561 (5th Cir 1983).
"'See Golden State Transit Corp v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103, 105 (1989) ("We
have repeatedly held that the coverage of [Section 1983] must be broadly construed.");
Bell, 456 US at 521 ("There is no doubt that 'if we are to give Title IX the scope that its
origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.'"), quoting United
States v Price, 383 US 787, 801 (1966).
.'Hagen v Utah, 510 US 399, 416 (1994). See also note 70.
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tional, defendants and to take advantage of the more lenient bur-
den of proof under Section 1983 for establishing supervisory li-
ability.
A. Proper Defendants Under Title IX and Section 1983
The conclusion that Title IX has no preclusive effect on Sec-
tion 1983 claims has important consequences for plaintiffs and
the defendants they attempt to sue. Plaintiffs alleging sexual
harassment in schools may have a long list of potential defen-
dants, including classmates (if peer sexual harassment is in-
volved), teachers, the principal, the superintendent, and individ-
ual members of the school board, as well as the school district and
the municipality in which it operates. Section 1983 allows a
plaintiff to sue all defendants in their personal capacities," 2 but
whether individuals may be sued under Title IX remains an open
question."' Although one lower court has held that individuals
are proper defendants under Title ]X," 4 most courts have held
that Title IX precludes a cause of action against individuals "be-
cause they are not recipients of federal funds within the meaning
of Title IX and its implementing regulations.""5 If individuals
cannot be sued under Title IX," '6 and if--contrary to the conclu-
sion of this Comment-Title IX precludes all Section 1983 claims,
then the long list of potential defendants is reduced to the school
district and the municipality. Section 1983 preclusion, therefore,
would deny the plaintiff the ability to assert her constitutional
.'Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 180-83 (1961).
"'See Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title ZX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination
in the Gym and Classroom, 21 Nova L Rev 545, 551-52 & n 27, 660 (1997).
".Mennone, 889 F Supp at 56.
"'Nelson v Temple University, 920 F Supp 633, 638 n 9 (E D Pa 1996). See also Lipsett
v University of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 901 (1st Cir 1988); Clay v Board of Trustees of
Neosho County Community College, 905 F Supp 1488, 1495 (D Kan 1995); Garza v Galena
Park Independent School District, 914 F Supp 1437, 1438 (S D Tex 1994); Mann v Univer-
sity of Cincinnati, 864 F Supp 44, 47-48 (S D Ohio 1994); Slaughter v Waubonsee Commu-
nity College, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 16621, *6 (N D Ill); Doe v Petaluma City School District,
830 F Supp 1560, 1563 (N D Cal 1993), revd on other grounds, 54 F3d 1447 (9th Cir 1995),
and reconsidered, 949 F Supp 1415 (N D Cal 1996); Floyd v Waiters, 831 F Supp 867, 876
(M D Ga 1993).
"'It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would decide the issue of individual
liability under Title D. The Court did not foreclose the possibility that individuals may be
proper defendants under Title IX in either Cannon, 441 US at 677, or Franklin v Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 US 60, 60 (1992). Although the Cannon majority never made
the distinction between individual and institutional defendants, Justice White's dissent
suggests that at least he thought that the Cannon majority would permit individuals to be
sued under Title IX. Justice White argues that, contrary to the majority's findings, "Con-
gress did not intend to create a private remedy for discrimination practiced not under
color of state law but by private parties or institutions." 441 US at 724 (White dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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rights against any of the individual wrongdoers involved in the
case.
None of the circuit courts that has addressed the Section
1983 preclusion issue in the context of Title IX has considered the
impact of preclusion analysis on the ability of plaintiffs to sue
certain defendants. Although the Sea Clammers and Smith tests
do not involve such considerations explicitly, the tests do embody
Section 1983's overarching objective of protecting the rights of in-
dividuals against the constitutionally impermissible conduct of
individuals acting under color of state law."7
B. Supervisory Liability Under Title IX and Section 1983
The preclusive effects of Title IX also have a significant im-
pact on the ability of plaintiffs to hold supervisory officials and
institutions liable for the conduct of subordinates. Under Section
1983, supervisory officials and institutions cannot be held vicari-
ously liable under a respondeat superior theory."' Instead, plain-
tiffs asserting Section 1983 actions against supervisory officials
in their individual capacities generally must show a form of gross
negligence amounting to deliberate indifference in order to es-
tablish liability."9  Plaintiffs asserting Section 1983 claims
against institutions for the conduct of their subordinates must es-
tablish that an institutional policy or custom was the "moving
force" behind the plaintiff's injury.20
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gebser v Lago
Vista Independent School District,2' plaintiffs will find it much
more difficult to prove supervisory liability under Title IX than
under Section 1983. In Gebser, the Supreme Court held that, in
"'See, for example, Mitchum v Foster, 407 US 225, 239 (1972) ("Section 1983 opened
the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incur-
sions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the nation."); Monroe, 365 US at 179-80 (establishing individual liability
against those acting under color of state law who deprive any citizen of his rights under
the Constitution or federal laws).
"'Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658, 694 (1978).
"'The law is unsettled as to the precise standard for supervisory liability under Sec-
tion 1983. Most courts have applied a deliberate-indifference-plus-causation standard.
See, for example, Lipsett, 864 F2d at 914 (applying a "gross negligence amounting to de-
liberate indifference" standard); Stoneking v Bradford Area School District, 882 F2d 720,
724 (3d Cir 1989) (applying a "reckless indifference" standard); Doe v Taylor Independent
School District, 15 F3d 443, 454 (5th Cir 1994) (applying a "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard); Gates v Unified School District, 996 F2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir 1993) (same).
' "Board of the County Commissioners v Brown, 117 S Ct 1382, 1388 (1997) ("The
plaintiff must.., demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was
the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff.., must demonstrate a di-
rect causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.").
' 118 S Ct 1989 (1998).
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order for a school district to be liable for the conduct of its subor-
dinates, a plaintiff must establish that the district had actual
knowledge of the underlying violation and that it acted with de-
liberate indifference in failing to prevent the injury.22 Presuma-
bly, the same standard of Title IX supervisory liability would be
applied to individual defendants if the Supreme Court were to
hold that individuals were proper defendants under Title IX.
The Supreme Court's actual knowledge plus deliberate indif-
ference test for institutional supervisory liability under Title IX
will make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to meet their burden
because sexual offenders often "rely on the silence of their vic-
tims."24 In other words, the secret and embarrassing nature of
sexual harassment and abuse might make it unlikely that anyone
other than the offender and the victim will have actual knowl-
edge of the occurrences in question.'25
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court case law on Section 1983 preclusion,
viewed in light of the history of Section 1983 actions and the poli-
cies underlying the statute, leads to the conclusion that Title IX
has no preclusive effect on either statute-based or Constitution-
based Section 1983 claims. The driving force behind this conclu-
sion-that Congress did not intend to preclude the Section 1983
cause of action-manifests itself in the general, unelaborate re-
medial scheme of Title IX as well as the legislative history of the
statute, which suggests that Congress fully expected plain tiffs to
bring private lawsuits to vindicate their rights. Because congres-
sional intent is the linchpin of both Section 1983 preclusion law
and the law of implied rights of action, the fact that the Supreme
Court already has found an implied right of action under Title IX
compels the same conclusion that has been achieved by the me-
'"id at 1999.
'"Although the Court in Gebser did not reach the issue of supervisory liability for in-
dividuals under Title IX, its strong language in support of the "actual notice" requirement
makes it unlikely that such a requirement would apply to individual defendants as well.
Id at 1998-99.
" 
4Heckman, 21 Nova L Rev at 635 (cited in note 113).
' [A] group of civil rights organizations led by the National Women's Law Center...
said in their brief [in Gebser] that because many victims of sexual harassment by teachers
felt isolated and afraid to report it, a liability standard that depended on official knowl-
edge would effectively immunize school districts much of the time." Linda Greenhouse,
School Districts Are Given a Shield in Sex Harassment, NY Times Al (June 23, 1998). In-
deed, the plaintiff in Gebser testified that she had been afraid to tell anyone about her re-
lationship with the teacher. Id.
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thodical framework presented by this Comment. Once courts
have found an implied right of action under a particular statute,
there can be no Section 1983 preclusion because Congress, by the
very definition of an implied right of action, must not have in-
tended to preclude private remedies.
